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The Public Health Responsibility Deal: brokering a deal 
for public health, but on whose terms? 
Introduction 
Globally, obesity prevalence has doubled since 1980 [1]. Interventions have focused on 
motivating behavioural change through the provision of information to individuals [2,3]. 
But despite widespread recognition of the scale of the problem, in no country has it been 
reversed through public health measures [4]. Acknowledgement of this situation has 
driven a fundamental change in the policy approach to obesity. Interventions that focus 
on individual choice are being complemented by policy that takes an ecological 
approach, recognising that individuals are ultimately responsible for their health 
behaviours but that choices are made in the context of a larger, ‘obesogenic’ 
environment [4,5].  
 
To reengineer the environment to prevent obesity requires a societal approach involving 
governments, civil society and the private sector [4,6]. Some form of engagement with 
the food industry is necessary due to its influence over the food environment. The World 
Health Organisation (WHO), for example, has promoted a multisectoral, ‘whole of 
society’ approach to obesity prevention, calling on civil society and the private sector, 
including the food industry, to ‘partner’ with governments on the implementation of public 
health measures [6,7].  
 
This article investigates the potential impact of private sector engagement in public 
health by looking at a working example; the Public Health Responsibility Deal in England 
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(from now on referred to as ‘the Responsibility Deal’). Specifically, it analyses the 
Responsibility Deal calorie reduction pledge; its stakeholder representation, working 
practices, and development and implementation, in order to identify the role and 
influence of the private sector.  
 
The Responsibility Deal was launched in England in March 2011 and represents a 
partnership approach to public health whereby Government engages private sector and 
NGO partners in efforts to address public health objectives. The Deal is organised into 
five networks each with specific focus; food, alcohol, physical activity, health at work, or 
behaviour change. Partner organisations pledge voluntary actions, agreed by the 
networks, which are designed to help meet public health goals. The argument for the 
voluntary approach is that it allows practical actions to be agreed upon more quickly and 
with less cost than legislation [8]. 
 
Between March 2011 and June 2013, the Food Network of the Responsibility Deal 
developed pledges that addressed out-of-home calorie labeling, trans fat removal, salt 
reduction, fruit and vegetable promotion, and calorie reduction. The calorie reduction 
initiative is notable for its ambition to drive the national obesity target in England of ‘a 
downward trend in the level of excess weight averaged across all adults by 2020’. This is 
to be achieved by reducing the nation’s collective calorie intake by five billion calories 
per day; equivalent to 100 calories per person per day and an estimate of the average 
reduction necessary to achieve a healthy weight [9]. Responsibility Deal partners pledge 
to reduce calories through reformulation and portion size reduction of products, and by 
encouraging behavioural change in consumers through activities such as the promotion 
of smaller portion sizes or making healthier products available. This approach, 
influenced by behavioural science theories [10], aims to make the existing, default 
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choice the lower calorie choice (as opposed to offering lower calorie alternatives). Thus 
‘nudging’ consumers towards reduced calorie consumption. 
 
The Responsibility Deal is among several types of voluntary arrangements that have 
emerged within the past decade where policymakers and government bureaucrats have 
favoured collaborative, voluntary approaches, as opposed to legislative or regulatory 
approaches, to address leading public health problems [11, 12]. The argument in favour 
of collaboration with industry partners is that it is more effective than acting 
independently of them. The argument against suggests that the approach affords 
industry the opportunity to influence the development of public health policy to its own 
ends [13, 14, 15]. 
 
Other conditions that have favoured private sector engagement in public health include: 
the failure of previous public health intervention strategies; rising healthcare costs [3]; 
and the food industry’s appropriation of a responsibility for public health through 
corporate social responsibility activities [16]. Governments have adopted neoliberal 
policies that have promoted pro-business values, expanded the role for public-private 
partnerships, and delegated some responsibility for public health to the private and non-
profit sectors [17,18,19].   
 
In an environment conducive to private sector involvement, the food industry has moved 
proactively to pledge actions to improve the health profile of its products [4]. Coalitions of 
large multinational food and drink businesses have pledged to reformulate their products 
and to market them responsibly [20, 21, 22]. Largely business-led and self-regulated, 
such voluntary initiatives have met with scepticism from the public health community, 
including the World health Organization [13, 23, 24,25]. Comparisons have been drawn 
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with the tobacco industry, suggesting that weak voluntary standards and lax 
enforcement are employed as a tactical move to forestall legislation [25,26,27]. 
Governments stand accused of abdicating responsibility for public health to the private 
sector at the expense of more effective, evidence-based approaches [4,28]. 
Underpinning these criticisms is the perception that a conflict of interest between private 
interests (consume more) and public interests (consume less) precludes meaningful 
action [26,29,30]. Industry is not incentivised to re-shape public tastes if it presents a risk 
to existing markets and shareholder value [31] and only through regulation, or the threat 
of government regulation, can this conflict be over-ridden [11,14]. The industry view, in 
contrast, is that it is simply stepping up to high-level calls to play its part in tackling the 
problem [32]. It has argued that the conflict of interest lies in not acting to support a 
healthy populace ‘for unhealthy consumers do not purchase our products’ [33].  
 
The Responsibility Deal is an example of an initiative that harnesses the voluntary or 
‘opt-in’ actions of industry for public health ends. It is notable, however, for being driven 
by government. Comparable schemes are, for example, CEO-led [20,21], or co-
ordinated at a pan-European level [22]. The Responsibility Deal, however, is a formal 
public-private-NGO partnership initiated and led by the English government to address 
specific, target-based public health objectives, such as reducing excess alcohol, salt and 
calorie consumption [8]. Despite government’s leading role, there remain tensions over 
the involvement of the private sector. 
 
Shortly before the launch of the Responsibility Deal, a group of six prominent health 
organisations involved in developing the alcohol-related pledges refused to back the 
initiative. They expressed concerns that the pledges were limited in scope and not 
specific or measurable (see Bryden et al [11] for a discussion on the need to set 
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ambitious targets and the need for independent review or audit); that industry views had 
been prioritised and that there was no commitment to alternative actions should 
voluntary measures fail [34]. As an approach to obesity prevention the Responsibility 
Deal received similar criticism [28,35]. Counter to these concerns government ministers 
claim that the Responsibility Deal, now in its third year, has achieved more, faster and 
cheaper, than legislation [28,36].   
As a relatively new venture it is understandable that there has been no evaluation of the 
pledge in terms of outcomes i.e. a reduction in calorie production and consumption. A 
DH-funded evaluation of the wider Responsibility Deal has begun, although the initial 
focus has been on how to evaluate the initiative - a logic model for its evaluation has 
been proposed - rather than an evaluation of outcomes [11,37]). At the time of writing 
the first annual self-reporting procedure of the calorie reduction pledge had begun with a 
number of companies reporting the actions they had taken during the first year [38] but 
no population level monitoring was apparent. Despite this, it is possible to evaluate the 
potential of ‘the Responsibility Deal approach’ as a public health policy tool, by looking in 
detail at the initiative’s working practices. Are the concerns over the weight of industry 
influence founded? Or, in contrast to the perceived weakness of industry-led voluntary 
agreements, does the Responsibility Deal’s government-led approach provide evidence 
that with strong public leadership there is potential for voluntary actions to deliver 
meaningful results for public health?  
Methods and materials 
When research began in May 2012 it was assumed that the majority of the source 
material would be available on Department of Health (DH) websites; due to the 
commitment of the DH (and wider Coalition Government) to make transparency and 
public accountability a fundamental principle of its working practices [39, 40]. However, 
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no Responsibility Deal meeting documentation was found other than for two meetings 
held in late-2010 which were published on an archived DH website [41]. An email was 
sent to the DH requesting documentation from subsequent meetings but no response 
was received and so a series of five Freedom of Information (FOI) requests were filed 
[42,43,44,45]. Requests for information held by or on behalf of UK public authorities may 
be filed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which gives people a general right 
of access to information.  For the purpose of this research the FOI requests were filed 
via the website Whatdotheyknow.com which provides an online service for the public 
submission and archiving of UK FOIs [46]. Further information on how to file a FOI 
request can be found on the UK Government website [47].  
 
As detailed in Table 1, four FOI requests yielded 56 documents. Of these, documents 
relating to past high-level meetings were concurrently posted to the Responsibility Deal 
website. For subsequent meetings held during the research period this documentation 
was published directly to the website. All supplementary information used for the 
research was publicly available and includes government and NGO reports, media 
releases, and articles from peer-reviewed journals. 
 
Results 
Table 1: Summary of Freedom of Information requests relating to the Responsibility Deal 
submitted to the Department of Health during May/June 2012 and the 56 documents 
received in response. 
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Th
e 
res
ults 
are 
pre
sen
ted 
in 
two 
sec
tion
FOI 
Request 
No. / 
Date 
filed 
Requested information 
 
Number of 
documents 
[reference] / 
Date 
received 
1 
May 
2012 
 
Meeting agendas, discussion papers and meeting 
minutes etc. for meetings where the Food Network of 
the Responsibility Deal was discussed 
44 [42] 
June 2012 
2 
May 
2012 
Pertaining to the calorie reduction pledge: 
• The names of members of the calorie 
reduction sub-committee of the Responsibility 
Deal Food Network 
• A list of organisations that were consulted on 
the creation of the Calorie Reduction pledge. 
• Documentation from meetings where the 
Calorie Reduction ple ge was discussed. 
• Consultation documents and responses that 
led to the creation of the Calorie Reduction 
pledge. 
• Documents which detail how the Calorie 
Reduction pledge was modified in response to 
consultation with partners/other involved 
organisations. 
8 [43] 
June 2012 
3 
May 
2012 
Documentation relating to the monitoring and 
evaluation of the calorie reduction pledge of the 
Responsibility Deal 
3 [44] 
June 2012 
4 
June 
2012 
Evidence of incentives provided to partners for actions 
relating the calorie reduction initiative 
1 [45] 
July 2012 
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s. The first defines the working practices that constitute ‘the Responsibility Deal’ 
approach. The second section presents evidence of the effectiveness of the approach as 
a policy tool by documenting how the approach influenced the development and 
implementation of the calorie reduction pledge. 
 
The ‘Responsibility Deal approach’ to calorie reduction 
Stakeholder representation 
Oversight of the Responsibility Deal is led by a plenary group chaired by the Coalition 
Government Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt. However, it was his 
predecessor Andrew Lansley who initiated the Responsibility Deal approach and then 
championed its implementation following the formation of the Coalition in 2010 [48]. Hunt 
replaced Lansley as Secretary of State for Health, and chair of the Responsibility Deal 
plenary group, following a cabinet reshuffle in 2012 [49]. In addition to the Secretary of 
State, the plenary group includes senior representatives from industry and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and government advisors. Reporting into the 
plenary group are the five networks; food, alcohol, physical activity, health at work and 
behaviour change [8]. The focus of this article is the Food Network and its development 
and implementation of the calorie reduction pledge (see Figure 1 for a schematic 
representation of the Network’s organisational structure and workflow). 
 
The Food Network is headed by a High Level Steering Group (HLSG). This sets the 
Network’s priorities, commissions the development of pledges from task-specific working 
groups, and has final review of the pledges and their monitoring and evaluation plans 
[50]. It too comprises representatives from public, private and NGO organisations. As 
shown in Figure 1, at the time of the research the HLSG was chaired by a senior 
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academic with additional members including: a representative from Government’s 
Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition; six industry representatives (food, retail and 
hospitality trade associations; Sodexo, a contract caterer; Pepsico; and Tesco); and two 
public interest NGOs (PINGOs) (The Faculty of Public Health and the consumer 
association, Which?) [51]. The HLSG terms of reference additionally require one 
member to be a senior representative from a health charity [52]. This position was 
previously held by Cancer Research UK (CRUK) which stepped down in the second half 
of 2012 to focus its involvement on the Alcohol Network of the Responsibility Deal [53]. 
HLSG meeting minutes from June 2013 indicate that the health charity position was still 
vacant at that time [54]. Despite the involvement of the PINGOs all have publically 
criticised the Responsibility Deal approach, primarily regarding limitations in the scope, 
monitoring and evaluation of the pledges [35,55]. At the time of writing, the Faculty of 
Public Health (FPH) had recently announced its withdrawal from the Responsibility Deal 
due to the prioritisation of private interests and a lack of evidence that the Deal was 
achieving its goal of being faster and more effective than legislation [56, 57]. The 
departure of the FPH would leave just one PINGO on the Food Network HLSG.  
 
In relation to stakeholder representation, recognising the absence of certain 
organisations from the Responsibility Deal Food Network is also informative. Other 
PINGOs were involved in Food Network discussions prior to the launch of the 
Responsibility Deal but disengaged citing similar reasons to those mentioned above 
[58,59]. Also notable is the absence of the Food Standards Agency (FSA), even as an 
observer. This government department was responsible for nutrition policy in England 
until late 2011 and had extensive experience of working with industry to achieve 
voluntary agreements in areas such as salt reduction, food reformulation and trans fats 
[60,61].  
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In addition to the organisations represented on the HLSG, the Food Network additionally 
comprises a group of organisations referred to interchangeably as the ‘wider Food 
Network’ or the ‘e-Food network’ (due to the facility for its members to contribute 
electronically). The function of this group is to ‘test’ the outputs of the HLSG [50]. 
Documents show that the wider Food Network was consulted on all aspects of the 
design of the pledge from the early scoping stages through to its launch [62]. There is, 
however, no record of which organisations participated in this informal extension of the 
network. A subsequent FOI request, filed in September 2012 to clarify the membership 
of the wider Food Network, received a response from the DH indicating that this 
extension of the network primarily comprises the food and drink businesses that 
government seeks to sign to the pledge [63]. 
 
Figure 1: Organisational structure and workflow: the Responsibility Deal and Food 
Network, July 2013 (Source: authors)  
 
Working practices 
Calorie reduction was the fourth pledge developed by the Food Network; others focused 
on salt and trans fats reduction and providing calorie labels on restaurant menus. The 
five billion calorie reduction target was set by Government on the basis of independent 
scientific advice [64], but it was the responsibility of the Food Network to agree a 
strategy that would deliver that target.  
 
Records show that a key Food Network HLSG meeting was held in September 2011. 
The then Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, joined for the calorie reduction 
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agenda item and set forward his vision for the calorie reduction pledge to ‘tackle the 
obesogenic environment’, emphasising that ‘the initiative was not simply about having 
lower calorie options but was instead about shifting the whole offering in a healthier 
direction’. Discussions also covered a draft pledge that detailed the aims and objectives 
of the pledge, a ‘menu of options’ for action by participating companies, and the 
proposed monitoring process [65]. The draft pledge was approved by the HLSG shortly 
after and issued to the wider Food Network for consultation. 
 
Over the following months the pre-launch consultation process involving the wider Food 
Network resulted in a series of revisions to the pledge. A FOI response supplied five 
subsequent drafts dated between October 2011 and February 2012 [62] but no record 
exists of why the changes were made or which organisations requested them. There 
were no minutes on the Responsibility Deal website to explain the changes to the pledge 
or the HLSG discussions that led to them.  
Revisions to the pledge 
By comparing the drafts that resulted from the pre-launch consultation process against 
the final pledge [66] the revisions can be identified and some conclusions drawn as to 
their potential effect. Although there is no record of which organisations requested the 
changes, by looking at how the pledge changed during the consultatory period, and the 
interests that would be served by those changes, some indication is given as to the 
relative influence of private and public interests. Revisions to the three key components 
of the pledge - its wording, guiding principles, and monitoring process - are described 
below.  
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Revisions to pledge wording: remit expanded to include provision of information 
Following consultation with the wider Food Network, believed to primarily represent food 
and drink businesses, the wording of the pledge was changed as shown in Box 1. 
 
 
Of particular note is the introduction of the phrase ‘education and information’. This 
fundamentally expands the core remit to allow pledged actions that are not directly 
related to calorie reduction but which focus instead on providing information to 
consumers about calorie reduction and choice of foods. Also notable is the change from 
a commitment to report progress to a commitment to report actions. This risks 
legitimising the reporting of actions that do not represent an advancement in calorie 
reduction. 
 
Revisions to pledge guiding principles: actions do not have to be additive  
BOX 1: Revisions to the wording of the pledge 
The wording of the pledge was changed as follows (text that is struck through 
represents text deleted during the consultatory period; underlined text was added): 
 
We will encourage support and enable our customers to eat and drink fewer 
calories through actions such as product/menu reformulation, portion control 
reviewing portion sizes, education and information, and actions to shift the 
balance of promotions marketing mix towards lower calorie options. We will 
monitor and report on our progress actions on an annual basis [62,65,66]. 
Page 14 of 40
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
The guiding principles of the pledge act as a checklist against which pledged actions can 
be reviewed for relevance. Box 2 shows the significant changes that were made during 
the consultation period.  
 
Of note is the redaction of the principles that required pledged action to be new, to 
significantly enhance existing activity, or to be impactful. This is in keeping with the 
changes to the pledge wording (see Box 1) that removed the requirement for businesses 
to report how their actions have contributed towards the progress of the initiative. These 
revisions legitimise the re-appropriation of existing business practices as new, pledge-
qualifying actions. In contrast, the addition of the fourth principle; that pledged actions 
Box 2: Revisions to the pledge’s guiding principles 
The guiding principles of the pledge were changed as follows (text that is struck 
through represents text deleted during the consultatory period; underlined text was 
added): 
 
Guiding Principles 
Actions in pursuit of the calorie reduction pledge should: • be new or significantly enhance existing activity • reduce where possible the salt, saturated fat or sugar (NMES) content of 
the product • seek to deliver long term and sustained changes reductions in energy 
intake • include measures linked to the company’s core business • be carried out on a sufficient scale to make a significant impact  • be developed in a way which embraces the spirit of the Responsibility 
Deal to improve public health and seeks to avoid the potential for 
unintended consequences, including the likelihood of exacerbating health 
inequalities • not conflict with, and if possible support work to reduce the salt and/or 
saturated fat content of products [62,65,66]. 
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must be linked to the company’s core business, could strengthen the pledge by ensuring 
that any actions taken are significant in their scope.  
  
Revisions to pledge monitoring process: quantitative metrics removed 
The five billion calorie reduction target was set by Government as a means to calibrate 
the scale of action at national level [64]. At the company level signatories must report 
actions that contribute towards the national target via an annual monitoring form 
published on the Responsibility Deal website. When the HLSG first agreed the 
monitoring form it required qualitative and quantitative reporting. For example, 
reformulated products or reduced portion sizes should replace existing products and the 
number of products affected must be recorded. To get to this stage had already required 
compromise. The HLSG had discussed setting company or sector level targets, and 
taking baseline measurements from which progress could be measured, but these 
measures were not adopted [65]. 
 
During the consultation period the requirement for quantitative monitoring metrics was 
removed. Signatories are not obliged to disclose whether affected products will replace 
or coexist with the original full calorie product. The only mandatory monitoring 
requirement is a 500-word (maximum) narrative describing activities undertaken [67]. 
Actions are not quantified, unless voluntarily, and therefore cannot easily be evaluated 
for their contribution to the five billion calorie target. No evidence was found of plans to 
monitor or evaluate outcomes at the population level. 
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Effectiveness of delivering broad engagement 
The final draft of the calorie reduction pledge was approved by the HLSG and launched 
in March 2012. At launch there were 17 founding signatories representing the 
manufacturing, retail and food service sectors (see Figure 1) [68]. By February 2013, 
almost one year after its launch, 29 companies had published a calorie reduction pledge 
delivery plan detailing the actions they would take [69]. Industry sectors are represented 
to varying degrees. Large fast food restaurant chains, for example, are conspicuously 
absent despite some being signatories to other Responsibility Deal pledges.  
 
Due to the voluntary nature of the Responsibility Deal existing signatories can opt not to 
sign additional business-relevant pledges. This is demonstrated by looking at the overlap 
between companies that signed a separate calorie labelling pledge and those that 
signed the calorie reduction pledge. As shown in Figure 2, most of the restaurant chains 
that agreed to add calorie labels to their restaurant menus declined to sign the calorie 
reduction pledge to reformulate or reduce the portion size of their products. This is 
despite many of those businesses being characterised by high-calorie, energy dense 
foods to which the calorie reduction pledge would be particularly relevant.  
 
INSERT Figure 2: Evaluation of signatories to calorie labelling versus calorie 
reduction pledges (Source: authors).
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Measure of effectiveness in delivering calorie reduction 
Whilst it is desirable to achieve broad engagement across the food and drink industry, it 
is equally important to evaluate whether the pledged actions relate to direct calorie 
reduction; the objective of the initiative. To this end the delivery plans were analysed to 
determine the type of actions pledged. In total, 102 actions1 were assigned, for the 
purpose of the analysis, to one or more of the following categories: reformulation, 
reduced portion size, new product development, marketing/promotional, and provision of 
information.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the most commonly pledged actions involved the development of 
new, reduced-calorie product ranges (26%) or the provision of information to help 
consumers make healthier dietary choices (20.5%). That these actions qualify for 
inclusion is attributable to the revisions made to the pledge during the consultation with 
the wider Food Network. Only one-third of pledged actions relate to reducing calorie 
content through reformulation (19.5%) or portion size reduction (15%) – the original 
primary objectives of the initiative. Few pledged actions commit to specific products or 
quantifiable levels of calorie reduction. Coca-Cola provides an example of one of the 
more specific pledges with its promise to cut the calorie content of ‘several’ of its leading 
drinks (excluding Coca-Cola) by at least 30% by the end of 2014 [70]. 
 
                                                
1
 Actions were excluded where the delivery plan suggested they were already underway at the commencement of the 
calorie reduction pledge i.e. they were not additive to existing company activities. Actions were also excluded if they were 
not directly relevant to the calorie reduction pledge e.g. some pledged actions related to calorie labelling which is a 
separate pledge.  
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INSERT Figure 3: Analysis of pledged actions – by type of action (Source: 
authors). 
Discussion 
In the absence of any formal outcome evaluation, opinions are divided over whether the 
Responsibility Deal is a weak alternative to legislation that has prioritised private over 
public interests, or a cost-effective and expeditious alternative that has harnessed 
private sector efforts for the good of public health. Critics, sceptical of the ability of a 
voluntary partnership to drive comprehensive engagement have called for a timetable of 
potential legislative measures as an ultimatum to encourage engagement [34, 71]. 
Government has said it will consider legislation if progress is inadequate but no detail or 
timescale has been provided [72,73]. 
 
The Responsibility Deal approach to calorie reduction was designed as a public-private-
NGO partnership to be governed by representatives of each sector [50]. However, only 
one of three HLSG positions reserved for PINGO was occupied as of July 2013, whilst 
industry representatives remained at their full complement of six. Formulation of the 
Food Network strategy involved extensive private consultations with a second tier of 
partner organisations – the wider Food Network - believed to primarily represent the food 
and drink industry ie the businesses that would implement the strategy. An important 
observation is that this is the intended approach of the Responsibility Deal as outlined in 
its terms of reference [50]. It deliberately and closely involves the food and drink industry 
in the specification of the measures they are to implement (calorie reduction through 
reformulation and portion control). Despite the strong potential for such measures to 
conflict with business interests (for example, through the risk that consumers reject a 
reformulated product) no sanctions exist to drive compliance. This failure to incorporate 
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sufficient disincentive for non-participation empowered signatories to demand revisions 
to the pledge and non-signatories to remain as such, as evidenced by the significant 
revisions to the pledge and selective engagement by the restaurant industry (see Figure 
2). Likewise there are no sanctions for companies that pledge actions that avoid 
addressing existing products through their focus on the development of new product 
ranges or health promotion activities.  
 
The revisions to the pledge between its draft and final forms widened the scope of the 
pledge in favour of the food industry and allowed for the inclusion of actions that are not 
additive and which do not directly reduce calorie content in the food system. Aims and 
objectives were redefined to the extent that they now recognise new product 
development and health promotion – common business practices - as progress towards 
public health goals. Only one third of pledged actions relate to the primary aims of the 
pledge, despite the former Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, having 
emphasised that the focus should be on the reformulation and reduced portion size of 
existing products. Although there is no record of the organisations that demanded the 
changes, the revisions strongly favour private over public health interests. This lack of 
transparency surrounding stakeholder representation and influence does little to 
enhance the credibility of an initiative already under fire for its close dealings with 
industry. Having PINGOs sit on the HLSG, albeit lower in number than private sector 
organisations, may suggest the representation of public interests, but this research 
indicates that representation alone does not guarantee influence. This finding is in 
keeping with the statements of those health organisations that disengaged from the 
Responsibility Deal citing, amongst other concerns, the prioritisation of industry interests 
[34, 57]  
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The amendments to the monitoring processes also reveal an imbalance in partner 
influence. If pledged actions fail to deliver the required calorie reduction then sooner or 
later it will become evident that objectives and outcomes are not aligned. In the absence 
of adequate monitoring, however, that conclusion will likely be delayed. As highlighted 
by this research, quantifiable monitoring metrics were removed from the draft pledge and 
the decision was taken not to record baseline measurements from which to monitor 
progress [65]. No commitment to population level monitoring was found, which further 
compounds this deficiency.  
 
Inadequate monitoring minimises industry (and Government) accountability – neither the 
success nor the failure of pledged actions can be easily evaluated. Critics might suggest 
that any delay to the evaluation process will buy industry some time. In the absence of 
adequate monitoring, the Coalition Government, ideologically opposed to regulation 
unless voluntary approaches prove unsuccessful [74], cannot easily evaluate whether or 
not the pledge is on course to achieve its five billion calorie reduction target. If failure to 
meet this target is the trigger for the consideration of regulatory alternatives, then the 
preclusion of evaluation would inevitably delay this process. 
 
Despite the revisions to the pledge appearing to favour private interests, this has not 
resulted in comprehensive engagement across all sectors of the food and drink industry. 
Few food service businesses, for example, have signed up to the pledge despite ‘out of 
home’ eating contributing 10% of calories consumed in the UK [75]. In some cases this 
is despite those businesses being signatories to other food-related pledges. That large 
multinational organisations characterised by high calorie foods can choose to ignore 
additional business-relevant pledges provides further evidence of the weakness of the 
Responsibility Deal’s voluntary, sanction-free approach. In addition to maximising the 
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impact of the pledge, broad take up within a particular sector of the food industry would 
create a ‘level playing field’ by reducing the commercial risk that participants are at a 
competitive disadvantage as a result of their actions [18].  
 
In principle it should be possible to achieve meaningful results through voluntary action if 
there are clear targets, industry cooperation and strong government leadership. In the 
case of the calorie reduction initiative there is little evidence of this. The degree of 
compromise required to find the common ground between public and private interests 
strongly suggests a lack of governmental bargaining power. This observation is in 
keeping with studies that suggest that regulation, or the threat of regulation, is the only 
evidence-based mechanism to influence corporate behaviour in the public interest 
[11,14].  
 
 
The implication of these findings is that the Responsibility Deal approach as a policy tool 
risks failing to deliver the required calorie reduction, and in the absence of adequate 
monitoring and evaluation this will go unchecked. As Government’s flagship obesity 
initiative this will have a significant opportunity cost both in public health and economic 
terms. More generally, the research confirms the importance of certain features to the 
good governance of a well-functioning public-private-NGO partnership. Such features 
include incorporating sufficient disincentives for non-participation [11,14], establishing 
fair and transparent stakeholder representation and influence [26,76], and creating 
measurable aims and objectives that are linked to the wider public health objective and 
which facilitate evaluation [71,77] (See Box 3 for actions to support these 
recommendations as applied by the authors to the Responsibility Deal Food Network). 
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Conclusion  
The Responsibility Deal’s voluntary, partnership approach is claimed by Government to 
have achieved more, faster and cheaper, than regulation. This research suggests, in 
contrast, that it is the collaborative, voluntary working practices of the approach that 
have undermined its potential as a public health policy tool and hindered its ability to 
deliver at a population level. The Responsibility Deal legitimises industry involvement in 
the design of policy measures, with no sanctions or targets to ensure those measures 
drive public health goals. It has afforded private interests the opportunity to influence in 
their favour the public health policies and strategies that affect their products.  
Box 3: Recommended actions to ensure good governance of the calorie 
reduction initiative (Source: authors) • Publish a timetable of legislative actions that will be enforced if the initiative 
does not meet its five billion calorie reduction target.  
 • Instruct an independent review of stakeholder representation and working 
practices to ensure that influence is appropriate and transparent.  
 • Devise SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound) 
company- and sector-level calorie reduction targets. Such as a flat rate 
percentage calorie reduction target across products of low nutritional value. 
The combined targets for each sector should derive from the five billion 
calorie reduction target. 
 • Monitor population level outcomes. For example, by monitoring caloric 
changes from the supply side (using sales data) and consumption side (using 
nutrition data) [78], or by using existing population weight surveys as a proxy 
measure for calorie reduction [79]. 
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The resulting distraction of objectives and preclusion of evaluation is likely to result in a 
significant public health opportunity cost. For the private sector to take meaningful 
actions that prioritise public health interests above its own will require considerable 
incentive. To expect them to be made voluntarily is misguided. 
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Captions 
Figure 1: Organisational structure and workflow: the Responsibility Deal and Food 
Network, July 2013 (Source: authors). 
This diagram shows the membership and workflow of the stakeholders involved in 
creating and implementing the calorie reduction pledge. 
 
Figure 2: Evaluation of signatories to calorie labelling versus calorie reduction 
pledges (Source: authors). 
This diagram demonstrates that it is common practice for companies not to sign up to all 
relevant Food Network pledges. In general, fast food and catering businesses have 
agreed to label the calorie content of their foods, but not to reduce it. Food retailers have 
agreed to do both. 
 
Figure 3: Analysis of pledged actions – by type of action (Source: authors). 
By February 2013, 29 companies had submitted calorie reduction plans to the 
Department of Health. In total these comprised 102 pledged actions relating to calorie 
reduction. The most common type related to the development of new products. This 
risks adding to product choice rather than reducing the calorie content of existing 
products. 
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*July 2013 – Withdrew citing
prioritisation of industry interests in 
formulation of gov alcohol strategy.
*July 2013 – Withdrew citing
prioritisation of industry interests in 
formulation of gov alcohol strategy.
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